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This essay links constitutional abortion rights, ideals of citizen­
ship, and ideals of gender equality. It begins with a pair of en­
dorsements and then critically assesses three popular arguments 
scholars offer in support of the view that a proposed doctrine of 
equal protection is superior to the Supreme Court's doctrine of 
privacy-related liberty, as the constitutional basis for abortion 
rights. 
In Part I, I endorse a claim that many influential lawyers and 
judges regard as a fraud. The claim, implicit in abortion rights 
advocacy, is that abortion rights are a precondition of full or 
"first class" citizenship for women. In Part II, I endorse argu-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. This essay includes remarks I made on 
March 5, 1 994, at the Federalist Society Symposium at the University of Virginia, where I 
participated on a panel entitled "The Constitution on Sex." It also includes my lecture at 
a Brown University Conference, "Equal Protection and its Critics: The Law and Politics of 
First Class Citizenship, " held on March 1 1 ,  1994. I am indebted to Norma Schrock and 
Elizabeth Allen for legal research, and to Professor Nancy Rosenblum for critical 
commentary. 
420 Harvard journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 1 8  
ments for abortion premised o n  the constitutional embodiment 
of the ideal of political equality and full  citizenship-the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Having previ­
ously defended the Supreme Court's doctrine that privacy rights 
against restrictive abortion laws flow from the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee of liberty, 1 in this essay I embrace a pro­
posed equal protection doctrine, as well .  
Abortion policy implicates women's privacy and equality.2  Ad­
vocates for abortion rights have sometimes implied the conflu­
ence of privacy and equality concerns by arguing for gender 
equality under the banner of the privacy doctrine . 3  M any have 
made privacy arguments with the goal of gender equality in 
mind ;  many have made equality arguments with the goal of in­
creasing women's  privacy-related liberty. A constitutional juris­
prudence of abortion that expressly draws on the Fourteenth 
Amendment's language of " liberty" and "equal protection" 
would meld with the reality that many of the root concerns be­
hind privacy arguments are not different from, or in opposition 
to , the root concerns of the gender equality arguments.4 
l. See Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 
U. CIN. L. REv. 461 (1987); Tribe'sjudirious Feminism, 44 STAN. L. REv. 179 (1991); Auton­
omy's Magic Wand, 72 B.U. L. REv. 683 (1992); In the Wake of the Abortion Derision; For Some 
Women, Some Solace, New Concern, LEGAL TIMES, July 6, 1992, at 23; Court Disables Dispuled 
Legacy of Privacy Right, NAT'L LJ., August 13, 1990, at S8, S14; Anita L. Allen, UNE.A.SY 
AccEss: PRIVACY FOR WoMEN IN A FREE SoCIETY ( 1988). 
2. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation 
and Qy.estions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 265, 377-379 (1992 )  ("Restrictions 
on abortion thus offend constitutional guarantees of equal protection, not simply because 
of the status-based injuries they inflict on women [that is, compromising opponunities for 
education and employment], but also because of the status-based attitudes about women 
they reflect." !d. at 379). Siegel astutely notes that "antiabortion laws ...  like antimis­
cegenation laws, have moorings in both privacy and equal protection." !d. at 263. See Web­
ster v. Reproductive Services, No. 88-605 in the Supreme Court of the United States, Brief 
for the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence as Amici Curiae Supporting Appel­
lees, 11 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 281, 285 ( 1989) ("the Court should not overrule . . . Roe 
without considering ... Equal Protection Clause argument[s] "). 
Cf Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional 
Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L. J. 599 (1986) (asserting that the 
closely associated domain of fetal rights also implicates both the privacy and equality of 
women). 
3. See, e.g., Websler v. Reproductive Health Services, No. 88-605 in the Supreme Court of the 
United States, Brief of Seventy-Seven Organizations Committed to Women's Equality as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, 11 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 249, 260 ( 1989) ("restric­
tive abortion laws deprive women of their freedom to control the course of their lives and 
restrict their ability to participate in society equally with men" ) ; cf. Frances Olsen, Unrav­
eling Compromise, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 105, 110 (l989) ("The Court's privacy analysis ... 
appeals to women's desire for equality and for sexual freedom"). 
4. In one respect privacy and equal protection concerns are quite distinct. The equal 
protection case for abonion privacy presupposes gender differences and would therefore 
evaporate if everyone were of the same gender and a potential childbearer. By contrast, 
l 
I 
I 
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My perspective endorsing the equal protection argument for 
abortion rights is "additive."5 Since "any principled argument 
that may help safeguard women' s freedom should be advanced,"6 
the equal protection argument should be added to the list of 
plausible constitutional arguments for abortion rights . Thus, the 
complete list of constitutional abortion arguments arguably in­
cludes distinct Fourteenth,7 Thirteenth,8 and First Amendment9 
arguments. A competing perspective supporting the Equal 
Protection Clause argument for abortion might be dubbed "fixa­
tive. " This perspective maintains that the Fourteenth Amend­
m ent privacy-related liberty argument is seriously flawed, 10 and 
perhaps even antagonistic to ideals of gender equality and full 
citizenship for women.11 The fixative perspective contends that 
an Equal Protection Clause argument could salvage the constitu­
tional case for reproductive rights; privacy jurisprudence should 
yield to a conceptually, jurisprudentially, and politically superior 
equal protection alternative. 
An Equal Protection Clause "fix" is tempting, in light of the 
actual and perceived limitations of the abortion privacy doc-
the privacy case for abortion does not necessarily evaporate in the absence of gender 
differences. Limited government, along with opportunities for personal expression, self­
development, intimacy, and repose would be important even in a hypothetical world in 
which all citizens were of the same gender and could bear children. 
5. Professor Nancy Rosenblum suggested the tenn "additive" to characterize my posi­
tion on the relationship of privacy and equality arguments. She suggested another apt 
characterization of my perspective: "co-dependency." Privacy and equal protection are 
mutually dependent, in my view, inasmuch as privacy rights can promote equality and 
equal protection can promote privacy and privacy-related liberties. 
6. Linda McClain, The Poverty of"Privacy?", 3 COLUM.j. GENDER & L. 119, 121-22 (1992) 
(defending abortion privacy jurispmdence while expressly reserving the "privacy versus 
equality" challenge). 
7. Many charge that the language of "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
support the abortion p1ivacy doctrine at all. I do not tackle their charge head-on here. 
Were thev correct, however, any valid equal protection argument for abortion rights 
would stand as the lone Fourteenth Amendment argument. But see Sheldon Geiman, 
"Life" and "Liberty": Their Original Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and Cu11ent Significa nce in 
the Debate Over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REv. 585 ( 1994) (arguing that the word "life" in 
the Fourteenth Amendment is a textual hook on which abortion law justifiably hangs its 
constitutional hat). Although I endorse equal protection approaches in this essay, I do 
not mount my own defense of them here. 
8. See generally Andrew Koppleman, Farced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defeme of Abor­
tion, 8,1 NVV. U.  L. REv. 480 (1984). 
9. See Rachel Pine & Svlvia Law, Envisioning a Future foT Reproductive Liberty .')tmtegie.lfur 
J'vfaking the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407, 418 (1992). 
10. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein. Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Speciall&ference to Pur­
nography, Abortion and Su11ogacy), 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 ,  29-44 (1992). See also Ruth Col!-;.er, 
Abortion and Dialogue: Pro-Choice and Pro-Life in American Law, ti3 TuL. L. REv. � 363 ( 1992). 
1 1 .  See generally, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rejlections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100 
YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991). 
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trine. 1 2 However, some of the most popular arguments employed 
to sustain claims of superiority for the Equal Protection Clause 
argument for abortion rights do not withstand close analysis . In 
Part III of this essay, I analyze three claims made by Cass Sunstein 
and others ,  starting with the claim that "conventional privacy" 
has nothing to do with abortion rights . 1 3 I maintain that ordinary 
understandings of privacy bear greatly on the purposes and con­
ceptualization of abortion rights . 14 Next, I assess and rej ect Sun­
stein's  further claim that privacy jurisprudence is inferior 
because it evidences disrespect for the unborn in a way equality 
jurisprudence does not. 1 5 I argue that privacy and equality j uris­
prudence are similarly neutral or non-neutral on the question of 
fetal humanity or personhood. Finally, I contend that the 
Supreme Court's  abortion funding decisions are not straightfor­
wardly attributable to the privacy doctrine . 1 6  There is reason to 
think the same outcome for poor women could have been 
reached, and is likely to have been reached, under an equal pro­
tection doctrine. 
12. Cfjohn H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v .  Wade, 82YALE LJ. 920 
(1973) (arguing that privacy doctrine resurrects untenable substantive due process doc­
trines); also cf. Olsen, supra note 3, at 117 ("Court should extend "privacy" doctrine to 
women, even as we pursue efforts to dismantle the false dichotomies [of public and pri­
vate] underlying it."). 
13. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 31 ("an abortion decision does not involve conven­
tional privacy at all"). 
14. "Privacy" has a broad and varied usage. Scholars who believe abortion relates to 
privacy include both those who tend to characterize the meaning and value of privacy in 
terms relating to the preconditions of human dignity, personal responsibility, personal 
expression, self-development, intimacy, and repose; and those who emphasize under­
standings tied to the political value of limited, non-totalita1ian government. Both empha­
ses capture an important part of what male and female citizens merit. See generally, Anita 
L. Allen, Uneasy Access, supra note 1, at 5-25. But see jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 
102 HARv. L. REv. 737 ( 1989) (contrasting personhood-related and limited government­
related conceptions of privacy and rejecting the former emphasis). 
15. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 39-40 ("unlike privacy or liberty arguments, [equal 
protection arguments] do not devalue the legitimate interest in protecting the fetus, and 
indeed make it unnecessary to take any position on the moral and political status of un­
born life"). See also Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, 
and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. lOll, 1046 n.131 ("[P]ro-choice arguments often seem disre­
spectful of the seriousness of the pro-life position."). 
16. See Olsen, supra note 3, at 113 ("The abortion funding cases highlight ... limita­
tions of the privacy analysis."); Deborah Rhode, Reproductive Freedom, in FEMINIST juRISPRU­
DENCE 313, 305-321 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993) ("The focus on privacy also has helped 
rationalize the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions upholding withdrawal of public 
funds for abortion services."); cf Laurence Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Ina­
lienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330, 338 
(1985) ("The Court's description of the woman's right as grounded in "privacy," rather 
than in the relationship of women to men, might give a surface implausibility to a refusal 
to provide p-ublic funding."). 
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This essay will not mount a complete defense of privacy-ori­
ented and equal protection-oriented abortion jurisprudence.  A 
defense of equal protection jurisprudence would necessitate 
coming to terms with Geduldig v. Aiello, 17 and the claim that the 
Equal Protection Clause is not a proper vehicle for addressing 
the overall inequality of women in society. A defense of privacy 
jurisprudence would include an understanding of why one need 
not rej ect Roe v. Wade8 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey19 as illegit­
imate substantive due process,20 as an abandonment of family 
protection,21 as "rootless activism,"22 or as lacking a constitu­
tional foundation. 23 Except by insinuation,  I will not much 
broach that large task here . Nor do I attempt a complete defense 
of privacy jurisprudence against all of the important feminist crit­
icisms. 24 I have undertaken elsewhere to reply to Catharine 
MacKinnon's well-known concerns that abortion law puts the 
cart of privacy before the horse of equality,25 urging that privacy 
jurisprudence is not always conservative of a regime of affluent, 
white male-domination.26 Linda McClain27 and Dorothy Rob­
erts28 seem to agree with my basic assessment of MacKinnon and 
moreover, have thoughtfully assessed concerns of the sort voiced 
by Joan Williams,29 Robin West,30 and Ruth Colker31 that privacy 
j urisprudence is in conflict with women 's  responsibilities or ideal 
ethics of care and compassion. 32 
1 7. 4 1 7  U .S. 484 ( 1 973) .  
18 .  4 1 0  U.S.  1 1 3  ( 1 972) (Biackmun, J. ) .  
19. 1 12 S .  Ct. 2791 ( 1 992) (O'Connor,]. ) .  
20. See generally Ely, supra note 1 2. 
2 1 .  See David M. Smolin, The jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 
MARQ. L. REv. 975 ( 1 992) .  
22. See Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BuRGER CouRT: THE 
CouNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN 'T 198-2 17  ( 1986) . 
23. Cf Gelman, supra note 7 (writing that the original meaning of "liberty" in the Con­
stitution is incompatible with the Court's abortion privacy jurisprudence) . 
24. Sf� generally, Olsen ,  supra note 3, at 11 0-1ll (privacy jurisprudence both attracts 
and repels women and feminists ) ;  see also .Allen, Taking Liberties, supra note 1 ,  at 470-473. 
25. See generally MacKinnon ,  supra note ll, at 1 289. 
26. See Allen, Uneasy Access, supra note 1, at 54-8 1 .  
27. See generally McClain, supra note 6 .  
28.  See generally D orothy E .  Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of 
Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 14 19  ( 1 991 ) .  
29. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U .  L. 
REv. 1559, 1584 ( 1991 ) .  
30. See Robin West, Farward: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 H.'\Rv. L .  REv. 43, 79-85 
( 1 990) .  
3 1 .  See Colker, supra note 15 ,  at 1 050-1 074. 
32. Legal feminists are not alone in suggesting that privacy jurisprudence fails women. 
See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 2 1 ,  at 1 020 ( "Privacy rhetorically claims to empower women 
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The specific goal for this essay is to deflate the previously iden­
tified trio of arguments commonly used by feminists and other 
theorists of varied stripes to support the thesis that equal protec­
tion is superior to privacy as a constitutional framework for abor­
tion law. I believe abortion rights are a precondition of full 
citizenship for women and disagree with those who believe pri­
vacy-bas ed abortion j urisprudence is more of an impediment 
than an aid. If it is true that privacy jurisprudence has delayed 
women's journey toward first-class citizenship,33 it is unclear that 
an equal protection doctrine would serve as a surer ticket. 
II. SEcOND-cLASs CITIZENSHIP 
A. The Constitution on Gender 
Constitutional law treats gender. But how does it  treat gender 
and how justly? Does it treat women as constitutional persons 
and full citizens? The men who wrote the original Constitution, 
the Bill of Rights, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend­
ments did not intend a general release of women from 
subordinate and domestic roles . This history has led some to con­
clude that the text of the Constitution provides no autho rity for 
courts to invalidate legislation that discriminates on the basis of 
gender, or that compromises women's lives, liberty, and property 
more so than men 's .  Yet, one need not single out the j urispru­
dence of gender equality as egregious judicial activism . Scholars 
and judges commonly locate judicial authority in principled in­
terpretations of the bare, abstract language of the Constitution. 
A general principle of formal equality-a principle that just 
institutions treat like cases alike-is arguably the core meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 
Blacks and whites should be treated alike because they share a 
common humanity; similarly, men and women should be treated 
[but] it actually appears to increase the medical profession's domination over the preg­
nant woman's person and body."). 
33. Cf James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REv. 2 1 1 ,  
277 ( 1993) (suggesting that Cass Sunstein's and Catharine MacKinnon's preference for 
equal protection argument may be based on the idea that constitutional privacy is actually 
a hindrance rather than a precondition of equal citizenship). 
34. But see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537, 542 ( 1982) 
(arguing that although appeals to equality are supplanting appeals to rights, equality is a 
purely formal, superfluous concept "should be banished from moral and legal discourse 
as an explanatory nonn"). See also Peter Westen, To Lure the Tarantula from its Hole: A 
Response, 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 1 1 86 ( 1983) , responding to Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the 
Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1 167 ( 1983) . 
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alike , because they, too, share a common humanity. Of course, 
neither the races nor the sexes are alike in every regard. Respect 
for the principle of formal equality presumably squares with dis­
parate treatment of men and women to the extent of relevant 
gender-specific biological differences. 
It  has proven impossible to demonstrate that gender-specific 
differences are relevant to each and every social, political and 
economic disadvantage imposed on women. The irrelevance of 
gender differences to competence to practice la�5 and serve on 
j uries36 seems clear enough today, but other supposed areas of 
incompetence and unsuitability remain . Women need the pro­
tection the Supreme Court has accorded them under the Equal 
Protection Clause. They need heightened judicial scrutiny of gov­
ernment classification on the basis of gender,37 and preferential 
affirmative action in education and employment.38 
Needless to say, others would sharply disagree with these con­
clusions. The Supreme Court's gender equality jurisprudence is 
controversial . Some critics blast the Court for policy-making at 
odds with ideals of the responsible nuclear family. Other critics 
accuse the Court of falling short of equally protecting the inter­
ests of poor women and women belonging to minority groups. 
Indeed, the Court does not require government welfare pro­
grams to subsidize elective abortions for poor women. Moreover, 
current equal protection standards applicable to employment 
classify discrimination as either race-based or gender-based, im­
plying female gender and minority race are mutually exclusive 
traits incapable of compounding injury.39 
Contemporary feminist legal theorists generally concur that 
constitutional doctrine imperfectly serves women and merits revi­
sion. We live in an age where it can seem doubtful that our soci­
ety sti11 needs the messages of legal feminism. Recent television 
advertisements, in which women stand on a corner comparing 
the size of a man 's car to his penis and gather at their office 
35. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (holding that Constitution does not invali­
date state laws excluding women from law practice). 
36. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
37. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 
71 (1971). 
38. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
39. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginaliz.ing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Femi­
nist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theary, and Anti-Racist Politics, 1989 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 139; ALL THE WoMEN ARE WHITE; ALL THE BLAcKS ARE MEN; BuT SoME or Us 
ARE BRAvE (G. Hull, P. Scott & B. Smith, eds., 1982). 
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windows to ogle a muscular construction worker, imply that 
young women are no different than their male counterparts. The 
careers of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Oprah Winfrey, and M a­
donna imply that women can be as smart, enterprising and 
raunchy as men. Although the lives of many individuals and 
many cultural phenomena reflect changing roles for women, 
supporters of thoroughgoing gender equality should not take 
them as evidence of adequate movement toward gender equality. 
What appears on the surface to be gender inequality may 
sometimes reflect the voluntary preferences of men for tradi­
tional men' s  roles and women for traditional women's  roles . But 
women doing the same work as men or similar work, rarely "pre­
fer" lower wages and inadequate pregnancy benefits. Women 
seeking lives outside the home rarely "prefer" discriminatory bar­
riers to their success. The inequality of the sexes visible in em­
ployment, business, politics, fine arts, science, and higher 
education is  visible elsewhere .  Gender inequality is  particularly 
visible in social practices relating to families and in legal debates 
over regulating human reproduction. 
For several decades abortion policy has been a focus of legal 
debates over regulating human reproduction.40 The right to pri­
vacy dominates discussions of constitutional abortion law, but 
connections between abortion rights and ideals of gender equal­
ity have not gone unnoticed. Though shared to an extent by 
men, the burdens of sexuality, pregnancy, and child-rearing are 
overwhelmingly women's burdens. Laws restricting access to 
abortion make it more difficult for women to avoid these bur­
dens. Women' s  legally enforced disadvantages suggest "second 
class" citizenship and unequal protection of law. Accordingly, 
permissive abortion laws would seem to be required by the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
B. The Meaning of American Citizenship 
But what does it mean to be a full, first-class citizen? Accord­
ing to Judith Shklar, American citizenship entails "the equality of 
political rights" and " the dignity of work and of personal achieve­
ment. "41 Linda Hirshman embraces a similar view, extolling "a 
40. See generally, DAVID GARRow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRivACY AND THE 
Ivi<\KING OF RoE v. WADE (1994). 
41. SeeJUDITH N. SHKLAR, ArvlERlGAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QuEST FOR INCLUSION l (1991). 
1 
I 
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citizenship of politics and work. "42 Groups consigned to 
subordinate social and economic roles, by virtue of race,  gender, 
or another "immutable characteristic"43 fall short of the ideal of 
citizenship Shklar and Hirshman describe.  Women with un­
wanted children to care for, with low incomes, and with undigni­
fying work prospects are unlikely to vote, rule, or boast 
extraordinary levels of personal achievement. Barriers for women 
to meaningful participation in representative government and 
the commercial economy place full American citizenship out of 
reach.44 
By comparison, men in the United States enj oy an enhanced 
level of citizenship-first-class citizenship. In addition to the slate 
of political rights they now formally share with women, men also 
have social and economic power. Most relevantly, they have the 
ability to enj oy sex, family life ,  school, and careers free of certain 
basic, direct concerns about unwanted pregnancy and childcare . 
To say that a man is a first-class citizen is to say that he is normally 
" treated by the organized society as a respected and responsible 
member, a participant, one who counts for something in the so­
ciety. "45 Of course, some men are not treated with the respect 
they deserve . Their poverty, skin color, or immigrant status may 
reverse the presumption that they are capable of responsible par­
ticipation. But the healthy, heterosexual, non-disabled, affluent, 
white, Christian men enj oy a particularly frictionless form of citi­
zenship beyond the reach of other men and women.  
Kenneth Karst partly attributes men's superior political and 
economic standing to differing social roles tied to their inability 
to bear children. 46 Many individual women arguably have 
achieved first-class citizenship, despite childbearing capacities. 
But the situation for women as a group is different. Despite sig­
nificant legal gains, women as a group do not yet have the con­
trol over their lives that men as a group do, especially affluent, 
white men. For the ordinary woman to be an equal citizen,  she 
must, as Karst argues, gain control over her "sexuality and mater-
42. See Linda R. Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us Chickens: Legal Education and the Virtues 
of the Ruler, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1905, 1936 (1993 ) .  
43. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411  U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (describing immutable 
characteristics as "determined solely by the accident of birth" and as an inappropriate 
basis for assessing "ability to perform or contribute to society"). 
44. See Hirshman, supra note 42, at 1916-1921. 
45. See Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE L. J. 44 7, 465 ( 1984). 
46. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term- Foreward: Equal Citizenship Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 53-59 (1977) .  
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nity [of the sort] the abortion rights movement has epito­
mized in the slogan, 'choice.' "47 Society needs the legal 
guarantees of Roe v. Wade48 -or something similar emanating 
from Congress,49 state legislatures50 or state courts.51 Only then 
can vvomen as a group participate as equal citizens alongside 
men at all levels of personal and community life. 
The claim that women need abortion rights as a condition of 
first-class citizenship is usually understood as the claim that abor­
tion rights are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for gender 
equality. The responsibilities of unwanted pregnancy and child­
care can relegate women to second-class citizen status, when 
compared to men; but women who do not face unwanted preg­
nancy, due to their sterility, infertility or menopause, are not, ipso 
facto, first-class citizens, when compared to men. First, many wo­
men who do not care for their own children assume responsibil­
ity for the children of their daughters, sisters, or others.52 
Second, unwanted pregnancy and childcare are just two of the 
factors that make women second-class citizens. All women have 
certain social and economic disadvantages. All women are "kept 
down" by cultural stereotypes and reproductive policies that dic­
tate domestic, maternal roles, and track young working women 
into low-paying jobs. 
C. Life Before Privacy and Equality: An Example 
I claim a link can be established between first-class citizenship 
and abortion rights. But skeptics view this claim as hyperbole. 
Skeptics concede that homeless women or prostitutes in jail cells 
may be second-class citizens; but they doubt that in one of the 
richest nations on earth, women who are surrounded by loving 
families are second-class anythings. 
The Asnerican standard of living combined with the success 
manv women boast with respect to their maniag:es, children, j � CJ 
4,7. See 1\arst, supra n o te 45, at 463. 
48. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
49. See Freedom of Choice Act of 1993, S. 25, 103rd Con g. ,  lst Sess. (1993) (proposed 
legislation that would c odify the right to an abortio n  establish ed by Roe v. Wade). 
50. SPe CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § l9a-602 (1994) (codifying the right to an abortion 
prior to fetal viability). 
51. Se�: In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (holding [hat there is a right to an 
abonion under the Florida Constitution, independent of the Roe v. �Vade decision). 
52. Th is is said to be true of African Amencan women . See PATRICIA HrLL CoLLINS, 
BLACK Fn.HNIST THOUGHT: KNo\NLEDGE, CoNSCIOUSNESS, AND THE PoLITICS OF EMPOWER­
MENT 115 (1991) ("Grandmothers, sisters, aunts ,  or cousins act as o th er moth ers [sic] by 
taking child-care responsibilities for one another's children."). 
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housekeeping, community service, avocations, and employment 
can obscure the reality of the ascription "second class." The "sec­
ond class" label, which ought to apply to women of all races who 
are incapable of avoiding basic social burdens, adheres more eas­
ily to poor women belonging to historically subordinated racial 
minority groups. Unlike affluent suburban housewives, these wo­
men are distinctly disadvantaged. This may be why abortion 
rights advocates fearing the death of Roe v. Wade in the Rehn­
quist Court of the late 1 980s, often stressed the needs of poor 
minority women.53 
The need for access to safe, voluntary reproductive services is 
acute for poor minority women. 54 It was acute in the life of my 
own mother, who lived the first two decades of her life in a poor, 
black, urban neighborhood. My mother's early history reads, for 
her generation, like a case study in the need for race and gender 
equality. She eventually moved to a racially integrated middle­
class community and lived the life of a suburban housewife. The 
history of the second half of her life reads like the composite 
biography of a mid-century American everywoman coping with 
the consequences of laws and cultural patterns that dictate moth­
erhood and marriage while restricting access to contraception 
and abortion. 
Just a year after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 swept away formal 
baniers to race and gender discrimination in employment, edu­
cation, housing, public accommodations and voting, the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Griswold v. Connecti­
cut.55 The Griswold case established the "right to privacy," and 
banned laws criminalizing married couples' use of contracep­
tion. The same year Griswold was decided, my mother became 
pregnant with her sixth child. She was not happy about the preg­
nancy, and everyone knew it. She believed she had enough chil­
dren and enough hard luck. 
53. See generally L\uRENCE H. TRiBE, ABoRTION: THE CLo\SH OF ABsoLUTES (1990). See 
Brief for the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, supra note 2. 
54. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts VW!o Have Babies: Women of Colm; 
Equality, and the Right of Priva0·  104 R\Rv. L. REv. 1419 (1991); Racism and Patriarchy in the 
Meaning of Motherhood, l J. GENDER & L. 1 (1993); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RAcE & CLo\Ss 
(1981); PATRiCIA]. WILLIAl'viS, THE ALcHEI'v!Y OF R".CE AND RIGHTS (1991); Loretta ] . Ross, 
Afn:can-American Women and Abortion, in THEORiZING BLAcK FEMINISMS: THE VISIONARY 
PRAGMATISM OF BLACK WOMEN 182 (1993); PATRiCIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST 
THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERlv!ENT 115-138 
(1991). 
55. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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Few things had gone right in her life. She was born in the 
1930s in Atlanta, Georgia, where racial separation was strictly en­
forced by the police and the specter of the Ku Klux Klan. She 
grew up fearing, distrusting, and envying the whites who ruled 
her world. She was, an orphan. Her mother gave her up to be 
raised by her paternal grandmother, and then died several years 
later of sickle cell anemia. Her first stepmother had a mental 
breakdown and died young. Her unreliable father was an alco­
holic and a womanizer. Within her grandmother's crowded 
household lived aunts her own age who belittled her for being 
very dark-skinned and not having a mother. She was raped in 
adolescence. She became pregnant at fifteen. She married at 
nineteen, had a second child at twenty, and then gave birth every 
two to five years thereafter for nearly fifteen years. She devoted 
her entire adult life to her husband and their children. She 
never finished high school. She never had a job outside the 
home-her proud husband, my father, would not consider ex­
posing her to the glare of other men in the workplace, even 
when bad debts led him to file for bankruptcy. My father, an en­
listed man in the Army, was periodically sent to Asia for twelve to 
eighteen-month tours of duty. Yet, for the longest time my 
mother did not know how to operate an automobile; did not own 
anything of her own; and did not have power of attorney to do 
family business in the name of her spouse. 
Despite these hardships, she maintained a household seem­
ingly without want and conflict. Perhaps that is why, at the age of 
twelve, I could not comprehend why my mother did not want to 
have another child. When I overheard her saying to a friend that 
she would have an abortion, were it possible, I was angry. I wrote 
furiously in my journal: "How could she not want to have a baby; 
what else does she think she's for?" My mother did not have the 
illegal abortion she contemplated. She had a baby, hoping, she 
told us later, that maybe this child would be the one who would 
bring her a glass of water when she was old. 
While my father was away in Vietnam, my mother mustered the 
courage to start taking oral contraceptives, against his will. In re­
sponse, he had a vasectomy when he returned from the war. She 
said he felt the surgery restored his control and thus his passion. 
After all of her children graduated from high school, and her 
husband left the army, went to college, and became manager of a 
consumer loan company, my mother earned a high school 
f 
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equivalency degree, and attended a local business college. It took 
her a long time to complete her training. Her schooling was in­
terrupted by serious illness, the births and needs of grandchil­
dren, the marriages and divorces of daughters, and the slow 
deaths of her grandmother and father. 
When her schooling was done, my mother was hard to employ. 
She was a frumpy fifty-five year old quarrelsome black lady who 
chain-smoked, openly resented authority, and did not speak in 
proper English. A few months after she landed her first full-time 
job as a sales clerk in a retail discount store, she was diagnosed 
with lung cancer and died, ironically, on the birthday of her sixth 
child. 
Although the story of my mother's life may imply hard luck is 
the exclusive domain of second class citizens, it strikes first class 
citizens as well. My mother seemed to believe, correctly, I think, 
that her race and class origins in poverty inadequately accounted 
for the frustrations of her life. Her gender fixed her fate. Being a 
woman meant being a wife and mother to the exclusion of other 
ambitions. 
vVhen I was a girl, my mother preached that if I became preg­
nant or dropped out of school, the best part of my life would be 
over. I stayed in school for many years, and postponed mother­
hood until middle-age. My life has been much easier than my 
mother's. In many respects, I am the multi-dimensional citizen 
she longed to be. I am economically prosperous and have a 
happy family. Yet I have an ambivalent relationship with my sta­
tus as a citizen, at least when citizenship is given its loftiest polit­
ical meanings. Like many successful women, I feel that my 
citizenship is worth less than it would be if women as a whole 
were free of lingering inequality at home, at work, in govern­
ment, in science, and in the arts. 
D .  The Trivialization of Citizenship 
Despite exposure to poignant accounts of women's lives, com­
mitted skeptics will continue to doubt that women without liberal 
abortion rights are less than first class citizens. Conservatives on 
the abortion issue say that a person's political freedom and 
equality does not depend on access to a medical procedure 
designed to end pregnancy. The implication is that it would trivi­
alize the democratic constitutional vision to include abortion 
rights as essential citizenship guarantees; that the linkage 
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claimed between first-class citizenship and abortion rights is 
wrong and fraudulent-j ust so much glib polemics and inflated 
rhetoric .  The conservatives believe that abstinence and birth con­
trol, and if those fail ,  adoption and moderate sacrifice,  can as­
sure that women ' s  lives are as good as any man ' s . 
The debate in the Supreme Court over whether access to abor­
tion should be deemed a fundamental right can be recast  as a 
debate about whether women's  citizenship status is diminished 
by unwanted pregnancy. Justice White 's dissent in Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 56 condemned Jus­
tice Blackmun 's characterization of abortion rights as "funda­
mental ."57 Applying historical and political criteria called for by 
the Constitution, White argued that abortion rights are neither 
deeply rooted in the nation 's  history and tradition, 58 nor are they 
implicit in the concept of "ordered liberty. "59 While one can dis­
pute both White 's historiography and his political theory,60 I am 
interested in his political theory. 
Analyzing the concept of constitutional liberty guaranteed by 
the Due Process Clause is an exercise in itself.61 But if constitu­
tional liberty does not include reproductive control , then a na­
tional citizenship of persons free to engage in political 
participation and work continues to mean something disturb­
ingly different for male and female citizens. Women would be 
assured an inferior status since abstinence, birth control,  adop­
tion, and sacrifice are not realistic options for all women. 
The United States is only one of many nations whose political 
leaders, lawyers, and j urists fail to see the link between abortion 
rights and citizenship . It  appears that the leaders of most West­
em democracies view the matter as American abortion conserva­
tives do: liberal abortion rights are not essential to equal 
citizenship and liberty for women. Few countries in the world 
56. 476 U.S.  747 (1986) ( Blackmun, J. ,  authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Brennan, Marshall ,  Powell,  and Stevens JJ., joined. Stevens, J. ,  also filed a concurring 
opinion. Burger, C.  J., filed a dissenting opinion; White , J . ,  filed a dissenting opinion 
joined by Rehnquist , J . ;  and O'Connor , .J . ,  filed a dissenting opinion in which Rehnquist, 
J . ,  joined) . 
57. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772 ( Blackmun, ] . ) ;  !We, 410 U.S. at 152, 155 (Blackmun, 
] . ) . 
58. Justice White derived this test from Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.  494, 503 
(1977) 0 
59. Justice White derived this test from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.  319, 325, 326 
( 1937) .  
60. See generally, DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, ToLERATION AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1986) . 
61. See generally Gelman, supra note 7. 
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have enacted abortion laws that give women the freedom and 
economic subsidy they would need to control their reproductive 
capacities.62 In Japan, abortion is readily available and more 
highly regarded by the medical establishment than oral contra­
ceptives. But even there , abortion rights are not widely viewed as 
prerequisites of citizenship. 
E .  GERMAN CITIZENSHI P  AND ABORTION RIGHTS 
The patterns of abortion law around the world suggests four 
"models'' of express regulation: ( l )  prohibition, (2)  permission, 
(3) prescription, and ( 4) privacy.63 Prohibition is the model in 
nations like Ireland that punish most abortions as criminal of­
fenses.64 The model of permission is in effect in countries like 
France where laws permit abortions that meet more or less strin­
gent criteria established by government.65 The model of pre­
scription allows government officials to penalize unauthorized 
pregnancy and childbirth , as in the People 's  Republic of China.66 
Finally, where the model of privacy obtains, government may not 
enact legislation that criminalizes, prohibitively restricts, or re­
quires medically safe abortions, as in the United States, immedi­
ately after the Supreme Court decriminalized abortion in 1 973, 
the model of privacy exists. 
Germany, which is still undergoing a complex process of na­
tion rebuilding, aptly illustrates that Western liberal leaders do 
not view reproductive options as a core requirement of citizen­
ship or "ordered" liberty. Rising from the dust of felled Berlin 
Wall was a hope of a better life for male and female citizens of 
East and West Germany.67 German reunification required a rec­
onciliation of the liberal abortion policies of the East, with the 
more restrictive policies of the West.68 In function but not rheto-
62 . See INITRNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON ABORTION (Paul Sachdev ed. , 1988 ) .  But see john 
Tackaberry, Canada: New Abartion Law But opponents Vow to Continue the Battle, Inter Press 
Service, May 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, INPRES File. 
63. See Anita L. Allen, Legal Aspects of Abartion, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BroETHICS (MacMil­
lan 2d ed. ,  1994 forthcoming) (elaborating four models of abortion regulation) . 
64. See INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at 458-62. 
65. Cf MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DrvoRCE IN WESTERN LAw: AMERJCAN FAIL­
URES, EuROPEAN CHAlLENGES 15-18 (1987) (describing abortion policies of European 
countries). 
66. See INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at 100-103. 
67. Cf Serge Schmemann, Germans Codify DetaiLs of Union, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. l ,  1990, at 
A3 (describing the legal and social process of reunification). 
68. See Key Dates in History of German Abartion Law, REUTERS, May 28, 1993 (available in 
LEXIS, NEWS Library, REUWLD File ) ;  Stephen Kinzer, German Court Restricts Abartion, 
Angering Feminists and the East, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at Al . 
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ric ,  the model of privacy governed the East  and the m odel of 
permission governed the West. Reunification made aborti on law 
as controversial in Germany as it has been in the United States. 
A compromise East-West German abortion statute was enacted 
into law on June 27, 1992.69 The compromise law moving the 
enlarged nation of Germany towards the model of privacy was 
not liberal enough for many former East Germans. The law re­
moved criminal penalties for medical abortions prior to the 
twelfth week, if preceded by physician counselling; thereby plac­
ing the decision for early abortion in the hands of the individual 
women. However, the requirement of counselling compelled wo­
men to justify and explain themselves to the authoritative desig­
nees of the state . Moreover, the captioning preamble to the law 
did not suggest any policy concern for women.  It referred only to 
" the protection of prenatal/nascent life",  the "promotion of a so­
ciety suitable for children",  and,  vaguely, to " conflicts involving 
pregnancy, and the regulation of the termination of 
pregnancy. "70 
The German statute of 1992 was grounded in a model of per­
mission. The statute was similar to the Pennsylvania law partly 
upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey71 decision.  Women must endure waiting periods and other 
elaborate "informed consent" rituals that the state hopes wil l  dis­
courage abortion. 72 By virtue of Webster v. Reproductive Health Sero­
ices73 and Casey the United States has taken a giant step 
backwards away from the model of privacy towards paternalistic 
intervention and the model of permission. 
On May 28, 1993, Germany's highest court ruled the 1992 
compromise statute unconstitutional. The Court invalidated the 
law on the ground that it was in conflict with a constitutional 
provision it construed to require the state to protect all human 
life.  The Court invited the Parliament to enact new legislation 
consistent with its findings that, although abortion in certain 
grave , exceptional instances can be permitted, the s tate must spe-
69. Ferdninand Protzman, Broader Abortion Law Leaves Germans Somber, N.Y. TIMEs, June 
27, 1992, at A3. 
70. § 218 StGB (1992) [based on language of an unofficial translation of the compro­
mise statute]. 
71. 1 12 S. Ct. 2791 ( 1992). 
72. See David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertainty, 1992 SuP. Cr. REv. l ,  
4. 
73. 492 u.s. 490 ( 1989) .  
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cifically discourage abortion through counselling and insurance 
policies. 
A chief difference between the U.S.  and German constitu­
tional law of abortion is that Germany has a specific constitu­
tional provision thought by its Supreme Court to address 
expressly the right to life of the unborn. Perhaps wary of seeming 
to flout post-Nazi commitments to preserving human life, the 
German Court found it impossible to endorse the modestly per­
missive scheme set forth in the 1992 law. Yet, the German High 
Court pronounced that abortion may be obtained under its rul­
ing, if the life or health of the mother is at stake, the pregnancy 
results from rape, or the child would be born severely handi­
capped. The exceptions the Court recognized and its failure to 
mandate enforcement of criminal sanctions against those who il­
legally abort means that there will be abortions in Germany, and 
many will not meet the Court's official ideal. Germany seems 
trapped in the same quagmire of rules, exceptions, illogicy and 
hypocrisy that mars abortion policy in the United States. 
The U.S. and German experiences reveal that democratic na­
tions are not yet prepared to accept the proposition that citizen­
ship implies legally guaranteed reproductive options for women.  
Western democratic liberalism is  not prepared to accept abortion 
choice as a right no less than the right to travel ,  to practice one ' s  
faith ,  or to b e  free of arbitrary arrest. For now, for our leaders, 
first-class citizenship does not mean reproductive control . 
III .  EQUAL PROTECTION FOR EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 
A. An Equal Protection Jurisprudence for Abortion Law 
Many scholars now believe that gender equality and equal citi­
zenship require reproductive freedom, and that the Equal Pro­
tection Clause should be marshalled against state and federal 
abortion restrictions .74 Although "laws restricting access to abor­
tion plainly oppress women," explains Sylvia Law, originally the 
right to abortion was "not presented to the courts as a clear issue 
of sex equality. "75 Instead, advocates challenged abortion restric-
74. See, e.g. , Gumo CAL<\BRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAw ( 1 985) ; Colker, 
supra note 10 ;  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to 
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375 ( 1 985) ; Karst, supra note 45; Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and 
the Constitution, 1 32 U. PA. L. REv. 955 ( 1 984) ; Catharine A. MacKinnon , supra note 1 1 ;  
Seigal, supra note 2 ,  at 379; Sunstein, supra note 1 0. 
75. See Law, supra note 74, at 973, 1 020. 
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tions chiefly on two other grounds. First, building o n  Griswold:s 
privacy doctrine, they challenged them on the basis of Four­
teenth Amendment liberty. Second, they challenged them on the 
basis of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, recognizing 
that the illegali ty of abortion had a especially harsh adverse im­
pact on blacks,  especially poor black women. 76 The racial impact 
argument never took hold in the Supreme Court, and the privacy 
argument stood alone. Liberals on the Court converted the advo­
cates' call for equality for black and poor women into a side-bar 
pragmatic policy consideration, where it has remained. Ironi­
cally, the Burger Court has been criticized for inventing privacy 
jurisprudence in a moment of "rootless activism" precisely to 
make it possible to secure for poor women the reproductive free­
dom rich women enj oyed.77 "No effort," Vincent Blasi con­
cluded, "was made in the Roe opinion to relate the woman ' s  
burdens to more general conceptions o f  choice-making capacity, 
bodily integrity, nonsubordination to other human beings, or 
equality of treatment. "78 Roe was motivated "by largely pragmatic 
considerations"79 relating to the fact that "many wealthy women 
were flouting the law to get abortions from respected physicians 
[while] many poor women were being injured by inadequately 
trained mass purveyors of illegal abortions. "80 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
much of Roe's traditional privacy jurisprudence. However, Justice 
O ' Connor's opinion for the Court expressly linked abortion 
rights to equality as well as privacy. Without their "unique" repro­
ductive liberty, women are unable " to participate equally in the 
economic and social life of the Nation," she wrote .8 1  Even before 
Casey, one could detect increasing awareness that the abortion 
debate has a "gender dimension."82 In Justice Blackmun 's pas­
sionate dissent in ·webster v. Reproductive Health Services, he said he 
feared for the liberty and the equality of women.83 Blackmun 's 
maj ority opinion in Thornburgh v .  American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists referred to the "promise that a certain private 
sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach 
76. !d. at 973. 
77. See Blasi, supra note 22, at 2 1 1 .  
78. !d. at 2 1 2. 
79. !d. at 2 1 3. 
80. !d. 
8 1 .  Casey, supra note 7 1 ,  at 2809. 
82. See Olsen ,  supra note 3, at 1 1 8. 
83. 492 u.s. 490, 556 ( 1 989) . 
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of government"84 and asserted that this "promise extends to wo­
men as well as to men. "85 
A year after the Casey decision Justice  Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
j oined the Court. Ginsburg has advanced a strong equality-based 
perspective on abortion rights.86 Her view is that gender inequal­
ity is perpetuated by abortion restrictions and that the Equal Pro­
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a strong b asis for 
claiming abortion rights under the Constitution. It is so strong 
that Roe was weakened by "concentration on a medically ap­
proved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a consti tutionally­
based sex-equality idea. "87 
Noting that "abortion restrictions selectively turn women's  re­
productive capacities into something for the use and control of 
others" and that " [n]  o parallel disability is imposed on men,"  
Cass Sunstein has offered a particularly clear outline of the ele­
ments of a strong equal protection argument for abortion rights 
of the general sort Ginsburg and others advocate: 
In its fullest form, the argument from equality is supported by 
four different points :  ( l )  prohibiting abortion is a form of 
prima facie or de jure sex discrimination;  ( 2 )  i t  is imperrnissi­
bly selective [in compelling parentage] ; (3)  it results fro m  
constitutionally unacceptable stereotypes [of different  roles 
for men and women ] ; and ( 4) it fails sufficiently to p ro tect  
fetal lives [since history shows that nearly as many abortions 
occurred in the U.S. when abortion was illegal] . 88 
I will not undertake to defend Sunstein 's  well-defended version 
of the equal protection argument. (Doing so would take me 
afield of my main objective, which is to evaluate claims of supeii­
ori ty for equal protection over privacy arguments. )  The literature 
contains adequate defenses of similar equal protection argu­
ments, including Sylvia Law's classic defense .89 Professors Law 
and Sunstein have in common the desire to articulate what they 
call a "neutral" standard for review of abortion restrictions90 a 
goal progressives may think hopeless . I will note that point ( 4) of 
Sunstein ' s  outline may be the most difficult to sustain ,  as esti­
mates of the number of illegal abortions prior to Roe v. �Vade 
84. Thornburgh, 476 U .S. 747, 772 ( 1 986) . 
85. Jd. 
86. See Ginsburg, supra n ote 74. 
87. ld. at 386. 
88.  Sunstein , supra note 10, at 3 1 -32. 
89. See Law, supra note 74; see also Pine and Law, supra note 9. 
90 . See generally Law supra note 74; see generally Sunstein supra note 10 .  
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range from a low of 200,000 to a high of 2 million. 9 1  It may be 
most fair to conclude that one cannot be certain that a lower 
percentage of pregnancies would be terminated if abortion were 
re-criminalized. 
B .  Equal Protection as a Replacement for Privacy 
The growing affinity among justices of the Supreme Court for 
an equality jurisprudence of reproductive rights is c onsistent with 
a "mounting consensus"92 in the scholarly community that equal­
ity arguments are, not only available ,  but "better than liberty ar­
guments with respect to abortion generally."93 A number of 
feminist legal theorists who advocate strong abortion rights,  favor 
constitutional alternatives to the doctrine of privacy-related lib­
erty. They view privacy law as distorting the truths of women's  
lives and impeding women's equal citizenship. Catharine Mac­
Kinnon has broadly assaulted privacy jurisprudence in abortion 
law,94 arguing that "the doctrine of privacy-related liberty has be­
come the triumph of the state ' s  abdication of women in the 
name of freedom and self-determination. "95 Privacy doctrine 
works only if women are equals within the private sphere. Mac­
Kinnon argues that privacy law and other "legal attempts to ad­
vance women"96 are based on false assumptions about the status 
quo, "as if women were citizens-as if the doctrine was not 
gendered to women 's disadvantage, as if the legal system had no 
sex, as if women were gender-neutral persons temporarily 
trapped by law in female bodies . "97 Joan Williams' ambivalence 
about arguments premised on " choice,"  "liberty" and "privacy" 
stems from her observation that women seeking abortion do not 
feel especially free.98 The language of privacy implies that wo­
men are choosers against a background of a number of realistic,  
attractive alternatives. Pregnant women who consider abortion 
9 1 .  See H. RosEN, ABoRTION IN AMERICA ( 1 967) (placing the number of criminal abor­
tions as between 200,000 and 2 million). It is unclear whose estimates should be believed. 
Rosen 's  hold special interest as a pre-Roe estimate. 
92. Sunstein, supra note 1 0, at 3 1  n . 1 1 9; see also Calabresi, supra note 74, at 1 10-1 1 1 . 
93. Jd. 
94. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNoN, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93-1 02 ( 1987) . 
95 . MacKinnon, supra note 1 1 ,  at 1 3 1 1 .  
96. ld. at 1 286. 
97. ld. 
98. Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1 559, 1 584 ( 1 99 1 )  ( "The choice rhetoric is not the simple unadulterated truth of wo­
men 's lives: many aborting women feel they have no choice but to abort."). Williams 
refers to "choice" as a libertarian rhetoric and an autonomy-self development rhetoric. 
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are not often so situated. The concepts of privacy, liberty and 
choice are at odds with the sense of choicelessness women seek­
ing abortion actually feel.  In general, "choice rhetoric is not ap­
propriate where patterns of individual behavior follow largely 
unacknowledged gender norms that operate to disempower wo­
men."99 Ruth Calker's rejection of the privacy doctrine is partly 
ontological . She insists that the privacy-related liberty doctrine 
relies on the false assumption of the existence of an autonomous 
sphere-women and fetuses-beyond public life .  Calker sees a 
connection between reproductive rights and compassionate so­
cial participation that she believes equality perspectives capture 
better than privacy perspectives: "equality doctrine doesn't  de­
mand that women be allowed to choose to have abortions be­
cause women are entitled to be treated with autonomy," but 
"insists that women be allowed to choose to have abortions be­
cause of women's  position in society-the roles and responsibili­
ties of women in society. " 100 
IV. AssESSING THE EQUAL PROTECTION Fix 
For theorists who believe the privacy doctrine should be aban­
doned, equal protection doctrine promises to "fix," not j ust sup­
plement the constitutional case against abortion restrictions. 
They believe it is a superior constitutional framework. Are equal­
ity arguments better than privacy or liberty arguments with re­
spect to abortion generally? I think the case has yet to be made 
that they are . 
A. Abortion as a "Privacy " Concern ? 
Cass Sunstein bases his thesis of the superiority of equality ar­
guments on a number of claims, including this one: Abortion 
rights relate to equality and liberty, but have little to do with 
99. !d. at 1 633. 
1 00.  RuTH CoLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE: PRo-CHOICE AND AMERJC.A.N LAw 85 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1 992) . 
Ruth Colker explains that: " [M ] y  defense of women's ability to choose to have a baby is 
not absolute . . .  it  is not embedded in the argument that a woman has the right to control 
her body under any circumstances . . . A woman in my view has the right to seek an abor­
tion to protect the value of her life in a society that disproportionately imposes the bur­
dens of pregnancy and child care on women and does not sufficiently sponsor the 
development and use of safe, effective contraceptives." Feminism, Theology and Abortion: 
Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1 0 1 1 ,  1 050 ( 1989) . 
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" conventional privacy. " 1 01 On this point, Sunstein is wrong. "Con­
ventional" privacy has much to do with abortion and with repro­
ductive rights generally. 
By "conventional privacy" Sunstein means privacy in the famil­
iar senses of physical seclusion, solitude, anonymity, secrecy, and 
confidentiality. The First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
are routinely interpreted as protecting these conventional pri­
vacy interests.  Theorists sometimes contrast privacy in Sunstein 's  
conventional o r  paradigmatic sense of  limited access to  persons 
and information with the controversial idea of "decisional pri­
vacy. " Decisional privacy can be understood as the liberty, free­
dom or autonomy to make choices about one 's  own life, 
minimally constrained by unwanted government or other outside 
interference. Those who rej ect the "decisional" sense of privacy 
as a semantic confusion of the word "privacy" with the words "lib­
erty," "freedom," or "autonomy" easily fall into the trap of 
wrongly concluding that abortion rights have nothing to do with 
privacy. Whether O"!" not constitutional abortion rights are coher­
ently framed as promoting a decisional brand of privacy under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, abortion rights plainly promote 
conventional forms of privacy for women. 
Sunstein and others have missed the evident connection be­
tween conventional privacy and reproductive rights because they 
overlook the respects in which the traditional roles of home­
maker, wife, and mother are inconsistent with ideals of personal 
privacy. For many women,  homelife is anything but a haven for 
the experience and enj oyment of personal privacy. Although 
meaningful opportunities for personal privacy consist of quality 
time and space for one's self, caretakers often cannot seclude 
themselves. Successful parenting demands that women be highly 
accessible and highly responsive to the wants and needs of their 
children. Parenting may be a greater hour-to-hour psychological 
responsibility for mothers than for fathers.  It remains to be seen 
what impact the consequences of motherhood will prove to have 
on women's permanent entry into the public realm as equal par­
ticipants and contributors. 
1 01. Sunstein, supra note 1 0, at 3 1 .  Although Sunstein recognizes the l ibeny interest in 
abortion, he believes the substantive due process critique of the privacy-related liberty 
jurisprudence, see generally Ely supra note 12 ,  makes it  less appeaiing than an equal protec­
tion jurisprudence. 
I 
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All of this suggests that, for the sake of conventional privacy in 
the senses of seclusion and solitude , women ought to take special 
care when deciding whether or not to have children. Decisional 
privacy rights protecting access to birth control and abortion do 
not automatically entail conventional privacy and self-determina­
tion for all women.  Two factors determine whether decisional 
privacy translates into genuine opportunities for salutary modes 
of personal privacy. First, women's  decisional freedom must not 
be preempted by insurmountable social and economic barriers 
to the exercise of legally protected choice . Second, free women 
with a choice must be willing to choose privacy. 
Procreative privacy rights are tools women can use ,  and are 
already using, to create opportunities for meaningful privacy in 
private life .  This is why feminists are mistaken to dismiss "privacy" 
rights as mere conservative male ideology. For some feminists ,  
"privacy" and "private sphere" connote problematic conditions of 
female seclusion and subordination in the home and in domestic 
caretaking roles. American women have had ample experience 
with privacy and the private sphere in this unhappy sense. Wo­
men have had too much of the wrong kinds of privacy: they have 
had home-centered, caretaker's  lives, when they have often 
needed and wanted forms of privacy inside and outside the home 
that foster personal development, while also making them more 
fit for participation in social life . 1 02 
Traditional caretaking roles have kept women 's  lives centered 
in the privacy of the nuclear family home . Conventions of female 
chastity and modesty have shielded women in a mantle of privacy 
at a high cost to sexual choice and self-expression. Expectations 
of emotional intimacy have fostered beneficial personal ties. At 
the same time, women 's prescribed roles have limited their op­
portunities for individual forms of privacy and independently 
chosen personal association. Maternal and social roles have kept 
women in the private sphere who might otherwise have distin­
guished themselves in the public sphere as businesswomen, 
scholars, artists and government leaders. 
Women who seek out and utilize opportunities for privacy, en­
abling them to rejuvenate or to cultivate talents, are women vvith 
something qualitatively better to offer others. A degree of privacy 
in our lives can help to make us more fit for social participation. 
1 02. See generally ALLEN, UNEASY AccEss, supra note 1 .  
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I t  can help us  to contribute to the full level of  our capacities. I t  
can make us  better, more equal citizens. Procreative rights pro­
mote privacy by helping women preserve and create opportuni­
ties for privacy in the context of responsible lives.  
Of course, to concede that abortion rights promote conven­
tional privacy is not to concede that the Court ever had good 
reason to embrace or stipulate a decisional understanding of 
"privacy" and to associate it with the Constitution . 103 Many the o­
rists (perhaps Sunstein included) insist that the whole idea of 
"decisional" privacy is a mistake . 1 04 They raise several argu­
ments . 1 05 First, they argue that, as an aspect of liberty, freedom, 
or autonomy, decisional privacy stands apart from paradigmatic 
forms of privacy such as seclusion, solitude, and anonymity. Sec­
ond, theorists contend that we lose our ability to treat privacy 
and liberty as distinct concepts if we speak of "decisional" privacy. 
Defenders of the decisional usage of "privacy" counter that deci­
sional privacy is worthy of the name. 106 They emphasize that 
although decisional privacy denotes aspects of liberty, freedom, 
and autonomy, it denotes aspects of these that pertain to deeply 
felt conceptions of a private life beyond legitimate social 
involvement. 
Controversial or not, using "privacy" to denote a domain 
outside of legitimate social concern is now an entrenched prac­
tice in the United States.  I t  may be significant that women in the 
United States now believe that their privacy, as well as their lib­
erty and equality, is compromised by harsh abortion restrictions . 
If they did not always feel that way, feminists and liberals have 
taught two entire generations of women to describe the intuitive 
wrong they feel when denied reproductive options as invasions of 
their privacy. Whatever "privacy" may have once meant, it now 
also means freedom from abortion restrictions. This linguistic 
development undercuts some of the power of critics wedded ex­
clusively to the "conventional" or paradigmatic understanding of 
privacy. Large segments of the male and female public now view 
103.  Cf Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 ( 1 977) (acknowledging physical ,  infonnational 
and decisional conceptions of privacy as pervasive in constitutional law) . 
104. See, e.g. , Ruth Gavison , Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J. 42 1 ( 1 980) . 
105. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy in Health Care, Encyclopedia of Bioethics (Macmillan, 2d 
ed., forthcoming 1 994) ( discussing decisional privacy and its antecedents in classical 
antiquity) . 
106. See, e.g. , Judith W. DeCew, Defending the Private in Constitutional Privacy, 2 1  J. VALUE 
INQUIRY 1 7 1  ( 1987) . 
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excluding others from "personal" decisionmaking as a form of 
pnvacy. 
Western law and political theory are rooted in the Greco-Ro­
man tradition, a heritage which may provide a degree of historic 
and etymological validity to the current practice of referring to 
freedom from interference with personal life as "privacy." The 
decisional usage of "privacy" has origins in classical antiquity' s 
distinction between private and public spheres. 
The Greeks distinguished the "public" sphere of the polis, or 
city-state, from the "private" sphere of the oikos, or household. 
The Romans similarly distinguished res publicae, concerns of the 
community, from res privatae, concerns of individuals and fami­
lies. The ancients celebrated the public sphere as the sphere of 
political freedom for citizens. The public realm was the sector in 
which select men-those whose property and economic virtue 
had earned them citizenship and the right to participate in col­
lective governance-could truly flourish . By contrast, the private 
realm was the sector of mundane e<;:onomic and biologic neces­
sity. Wives,  children and slaves populated the private economic 
sphere, living as subordinates and ancillaries to autonomous 
male caretakers. 
The Post-Enlightenment Western liberal tradition inherited 
the premise that social life ought to be organized into public and 
private spheres. 107 It  also inherited the premise that the private 
sphere is properly constituted by the home, the family, and inti­
mate association. However, while ancient thought tolerated the 
private and celebrated the public, modem liberal thought often 
reflects an opposing tendency: it tolerates the public as pervasive 
and necessary for collective welfare, but celebrates the private as 
an essential expression of personal identity, freedom, and 
responsibility. 
The political concept of a limited, tolerant government is elab­
orated by John Locke and Thomas Jefferson as a requirement of 
natural rights, and by John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith as a re­
quirement of utility. Both of these obj ectives require a non-gov­
ernmental, private sphere of autonomous individuals, families 
and voluntary associations. Though liberals sometimes speak of 
public and private as if they were fixed natural categories, femi­
nist privacy theorists often emphasize that the public and the 
1 07. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HuMAN CoNDITION 38-78 ( 1958) ; jURGEN HABERJviAS, 
THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 3-4 ( 1962) . 
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private are not metaphysical realities, but contingent understand­
i ngs of how, as a matter of policy, we believe p ower ought to be 
allocated among individuals, various social units,  and govern­
ment. Liberals often explain privacy rights as negative l iberties to 
freedom from government involvement; but feminists often give 
p rivacy an affirmative twist, arguing that privacy righ ts can man­
date government involvement where, without it,  material needs 
render privacy rights ineffective . 
The time has come for constitutional lawyers to abandon their 
stock and trade criticism that abortion jurisprudence is premised 
on semantic confusion about privacy. It  is true that early repro­
ductive rights cases reflected a degree of confusio n .  However, the 
Supreme Court has remedied the simplistic and confused under­
standings of " conventional" and "decisional " p rivacy reflected in 
the earliest reproductive rights cases. 
The precise relationship presumed to exist b etween decisional 
privacy and conventional privacy was not clear in Griswold and 
Roe. In Griswold Justice Douglas seemed to conflate physical pri­
vacy and decisional privacy when he raised the issue of enforce­
ment of criminal contraception laws . 1 08 Justice Blackmun in Roe 
seemed to conflate " conventional "  restricted access privacy rights 
with decisional privacy rights when he made his metaphysically 
suspec t judgment that a " pregnant woman cannot be isolated 
[from the fetus] in her pregnancy" as a ground for limiting h e r  
decisional prerogatives. 1 09 
Yet, in the Thornburgh case, Blackmun cleared up the confu­
sion well enough : stipulating that the "privacy" of the Fourteenth 
Amendment abortion cases is the claim to be free from forms of 
government interference with decisions affecting sex, reproduc­
tion, marriage , and family life . 1 1 0  At the same time,  Blackmun 
expressly recognized that, in the context of abortion ,  conven­
tional forms of p rivacy, namely anonymit-y and confiden tiality in 
health-care recordkeeping and reporting, are key ancillaries for 
safeguarding decisional privacy. 1 1 1  After Thornburgh, abortion law 
cases re·vi.ewing the consti tutionality of spousal and parental noti­
fication and consent requirements have raised anonymity, se­
crecy, confidentiality, and other information access c o n cerns 
108. Griswold v. Connecticu t ,  381 U.S. 479, 486 ( 1965) ( D ouglas, J.) .  
109. See generally Allen , Taking Liberties, supra note l .  
1 1 0. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747, 765-767 ( 1 986) . 
111. Id. ( "The decision to terminate abonion is an intensely private o n e  that must be 
protected in a way that assures anonymity.")  
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without appearing to confuse or conflate conventional with deci­
sional privacy concerns. 1 1 2 Indeed, the body of constitutional 
abortion law as a whole reflects a solid understanding of the se­
mantics of "privacy."  It acknowledges decisional and non-deci­
sional uses of privacy and appreciates that confidentiality and 
anonymity are needed to protect independent abortion decision 
and action. 
These several considerations-the practical link between re­
productive rights and paradigmatic forms of privacy such as med­
ical confidentiality and solitude at home ; the Supreme Court's 
eventually careful distinction among decisional, physical ,  and in­
formational forms of privacy; the etymology of res privatae; and 
patterns of popular "privacy" usage-strongly mandate rej ecting 
Sunstein ' s  claim that abortion rights have little to do with con­
ventional privacy. If an equality j urisprudence for abortion is su­
perior to a privacy jurisprudence, it is not because the practice 
and regulations of abortion lack conceptual ties to privacy. 
Today, constitutional abortion law reflects clarity about the 
definition of the word "privacy." More than twenty years and 
twenty cases after Roe v. Wade, constitutional lawyers are unfair in 
their designation of abortion jurisprudence as conceptually con­
fused about privacy. Bases for debate over the reach of Four­
teenth Amendment liberty remain for abortion law. This might 
imply the superiority of equal protection-based abortion j urispru­
dence were it not the case that equality jurisprudence also in­
spires serious debates about the reach of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
B. Greater Respect for the ''Pro-life " Perspective 
Cass Sunstein claims a second advantage for equality and equal 
protection arguments over privacy or liberty arguments: 
Moreover these [equality] . . .  arguments have a large advan­
tage in that unlike privacy or liberty arguments, they do not  
devalue the legi timate interest in protecting the fetus, and in­
deed make it unnecessary to take any position on the moral 
and political status of unborn life. Even if the fetus has all of 
the status of human life,  the bodies of women cannot be con­
scripted in order to pro tect it. 1 1 3 
1 1 2. See, e.g. , Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1 12 S.Ct. 2791 ( 1 992) ; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 1 73 ( 199 1 ) ;  Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 4 1 7  ( 1 990) . 
1 1 3. Sunstein, supra note 10 ,  at 39-40. 
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In claiming this advantage, too , Sunstein is mistaken .  As I will 
argue, in principle, privacy arguments do not devalue the legiti­
mate interests in protecting the fetus any more than equality ar­
guments; nor do they, in principle, make it any more or less 
necessary to take a position on the moral and political status of 
unborn life .  
Blackmun 's  opinion in Roe v .  Wade employed a privacy ration­
ale .  As a consequence, the most familiar pro-choice arguments 
happen to be privacy arguments, and privacy arguments are asso­
ciated with vehement pro-choice and pro-life conflict in the 
United States. Privacy is blamed for the vehemence of the con­
flicts even though there is little reason to think pro-life activism 
would have been less committed or hostile had women's  equality 
rather than their privacy been held out as the justification for 
permissive abortion laws . The pro-choice position seems shrill 
and unreasonable to those who do not share it  because it places a 
range of concerns, including women's privacy, equal protection, 
personal satisfaction, bodily integrity, and economic well-being 
above the protection of the beginnings of innocent human life .  
Sunstein's  claim that privacy needlessly devalues the unborn 
was doubtless prompted by Roe v. Wade' s stance,  maddening to 
some, that the state lacks an interest in the unborn at the start of 
pregnancy. The Court in Roe concluded that " [ a] t some point in 
pregnancy" the state interest in "protecting potential life"  be­
comes "sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation";  and went 
on to identify "viability" as the point at which the State ' s  interest 
in potential life becomes "compelling. " 1 1 4  But Casey modified this 
feature of &e v. Wade, holding that the state has an interest in 
the unborn sufficient to warrant protective regulation on behalf 
of the unborn at all stages of pregnancy, so long as the regulation 
does not "unduly burden" the woman 's right to privacy. 1 15 By af­
firming the basic privacy right of access to early abortion, while 
asserting a governmental interest in the unborn at every stage of 
pregnancy, Casey enacts the analytic possibility of asserting gov­
ernmental interest in the unborn while conferring strong privacy 
rights for women seeking early abortion. Casey may be an uneasy 
compromise , but it  establishes that valuing the unborn and advo­
cating a significant degree of decisional privacy for women are 
not utterly incompatible . 
1 14. 4 10  u.s 1 33, 1 54, 1 63-164 ( 1 973) . 
1 15 .  Casey, 1 1 2 S.Ct. 279 1 ,  2820 ( 1992) . 
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In associating the devaluation of the public interest in unborn 
life with privacy arguments, Sunstein may have been reacting, 
not only to &e, but to abortion privacy advocates who agree with 
the philosophy that fetuses are not human beings or persons 
meri ting state protection.  A number of philosophers supportive 
of abortion privacy jurisprudence have aggressively argued that 
fetuses are neither moral persons1 16  nor constitutional per­
sons, 1 1 7 but merely potential persons lacking serious rights to life 
or interests government may protect at pregnant women ' s  
expense. 
The privacy argument associated with &e v. Wade and de­
fended by philosophers who deny fetal personhood does not " de­
value" the concept of fetal protection by government in the 
strong sense needed to give Sunstein 's  claim weight. That is, it 
does not ridicule the very idea of fetal humanity or community 
interest in the fate of the unborn .  A belittling ad hominem attack 
against the Pope or an imprudent analogy of fetuses to cancers 
or parasites amounts to ridicule.  By contrast, the serious privacy 
argument typically advanced simply disagrees that the govern­
ment has legitimate grounds for categorically prohibiting the in­
terruption of pregnancy. 
Moreover, far from denying fetal personhood or humanity, 
some versions of the privacy-related liberty argument advanced 
by pro-choice theorists expressly concede it. Some versions of the 
privacy argument admit or avoid taking a position on the moral 
and legal status of the unborn . The privacy argument is no more 
wedded to the claim that the government lacks an interest in the 
unborn than is the equality argument. Some exponents of the 
privacy argument may happen to believe fetuses lack moral and 
legal interests the state is bound to protect. Some exponents of 
the privacy argument may happen to believe that fe tuses are par-
116. MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE, IN THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF 
ABoRTION 52, 77 (Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel and Thomas Scanlon eds . ,  1974). 
Tooley argues against personhood for the unborn on the ground that personhood re­
quires characteristics the unborn and perhaps even infants do not possess, such as the 
capacity for self-conscious reflection. " [A] n organism possesses a serious right to life only 
if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other 
menta l  states and believes that it is such a continuing entity." Id. 
117. See, e.g. , Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, NEw YoRK REviEW OF BooKS, 
June 29, 1989, at 49-53. Dworkin argued that "if the fetus is a constitutional person then 
Roe v. Wade is plainly wrong." !d. at 50. He then argues that the fetus is not a constitutional 
person, only "an entity of considerable moral and emotional significance in our culture" 
that can be protected " in ways that fall short of any substantial abridgement of a woman 's 
constitutional right over the use of her own body." Id. at 52. 
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asites o r  the Pope a j oke. But the same is true o f  some exponents 
of the equal protection argument. 
To grasp this idea, it is useful to compare Sunstein ' s  anti-con­
scription version of the equality argument, grounded in ideals of 
equal protection, to Judith Thomson's  anti-conscription argu­
ment, grounded in ideals of (privacy-related) liberty. 1 1 8 Sunstein 
recognizes Thomson ' s  argument as an example of one that "sees 
a prohibition on abortion as invalid because it involves a co-opta­
tion of women's bodies for the protection of fetuses ,"  but that 
does not base opposition to abortion prohibition on robust 
equality grounds . 1 1 9 He fails to recognize that the possibility of a 
liberty-oriented anti-conscription argument that concedes the 
worth of the unborn, could undermine his claims that equal pro­
tection arguments are superior by virtue of their concessions of 
fetal worth. 
Both Sunstein and Thomson are prepared to grant the moral 
worth of the unborn as a premise of their arguments. As Sunstein 
says describing his own argument, their arguments "freely ac­
knowledge [ ] and, indeed, insist [ ] on the strength of the inter­
est in protecting fetal life . " 1 20 The thrust of Sunstein ' s  argument 
is that by restricting access to abortion, government is con­
scripting women to share their bodily resources, while not impos­
ing similar Good Samaritan duties on other citizens: 
Government never imposes an obligation of this sort on its cit­
izens-even when human life is uncontroversially at stake . Par­
ents are not compelled to devote their bodies to the 
protection of children, even if, for example, a risk-free kidne{' 
transplant is necessary to prevent the death of their child. 1 2 
To sharpen his ultimate constitutional point that government 
cannot conscript women into the service of oth ers, Sunstein 
draws an analogy to what he regards as a patently unacceptable 
1 18 .  Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABOR­
TION, 3-4 (Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel ,  and Thomas Scanlon , eds . ,  1 974) . It is not 
relevant to this discussion that Thomson is among those reductionist privacy theorists 
who advocate using the language of liberty and property rather than privacy to describe 
freedom from government interference. See also Judith Jarvis Thomson , The Right to Pri­
vacy, 4 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. ,  3 1 5-333 ( 1 975) .  My point is that, however denonimated, Thom­
son believes that what the Court calls its "privacy" jurisprudence is defensible with or 
without the premise that the fetus is a person or human. 
1 19 .  Sunstein remarks that "I am indebted to" Thomson but her treatment of abortion 
prohibitions does not "sufficiently emphasize issues of sexual equality." Sunstein , supra 
note 10 ,  at 3 1  and n . 1 20. 
1 20.  /d. 
1 2 1 .  /d. at 34. 
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hypothetical case of race-based conscription. He contends that 
constitutionally, Mrican-Americans may not be turned into un­
willing lifesaving blood donors, even for other blacks or minority 
group members. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits singling 
out a person on the basis of race or gender for service to others . 
Thomson stresses the general abhorrence to compulsory Good 
Samaritanism in American law, 1 22 agreeing with Sunstein that 
"abortion restrictions selectively turn women 's  reproductive ca­
pacities into something for the use and control of others ." 123 
Thompson' s  libertarian defense of abortion choice features a hy­
pothetical: a person abducted in the night, whose body is at­
tached to a famous violinist as life support, has no obligation to 
remain, but is morally at liberty to detach herself and leave the 
violinist to die of renal failure . 124 One may not be conscripted to 
save the violinist, whatever the violinist' s human worth . 
Thomson's argument points to unwilling conscripts '  and preg­
nant women's right to choose-their decisional privacy, one 
might say-to use their bodies and lives as they please. However, 
the structure of her liberty argument is identical to the structure 
of Sunstein 's  equality argument. Thomson's  liberty-based anti­
conscription argument, like Sunstein's  equality-based argument, 
expressly seeks to avoid a stand which denigrates the moral and 
political status of the fetus. Thomson 's  contention is that, how­
ever precious the fetus or talented the violinist, a woman cannot 
be made to sacrifice herself. Fetuses have no right to life requir­
ing that they be carried to term in a society in which women's  
lives are uniquely impaired by unwanted pregnancies. Both lib­
erty and equality versions of the anti-conscription argument 
place the forces of law ideally on the side of the would-be con­
script-the pregnant woman-and not the fetus. 
It is implausible to suppose that privacy rhetoric inflames the 
pro-choice and pro-life debates in a way that equality rhetoric 
would not have, had it been the choice of the Court in Roe v. 
Wade. As Joan Williams points out, "claims for women' s  equality, 
particularly in contexts involving sexuality, trigger fears of chaos, 
filth, and defilement. " 1 25 Surely it is the common bottom-line of 
permissive abortion policy that provokes the virulence of pro-
1 22.  See Thomson, supra note 1 1 6, at 20-21 .  
123 .  Sunstein, supra note 10 ,  at 3 1 .  
1 24. See judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights and Deaths, in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABOR· 
TION 1 14 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds. ,  1974) . 
1 25 .  Williams, supra note 29, at 1586. 
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choice and pro-life politics. Those who blame privacy j urispru­
dence for the intractability of abortion politics imply that pro-life 
Americans would quietly accept the deaths of the unborn if they 
were premised on women 's  right to equal treatment rather than 
on women 's  right to make their own decisions about their 
bodies. 
On December 30, 1 994, two women were killed at Planned 
Parenthood and Preterm Health SerVices clinics in Brookline, 
Massachusetts. Accused killer John C .  Salvi, who also wounded 
several other people at those clinics that day, was apparently a 
strong opponent of abortion. 
On July 29, 1 994, Dr. John Britton, a Florida abortion doctor, 
and two elderly pro-choice volunteer escorts were gunned down 
by Paul Hill, director of the violence-advocating anti-abortion 
group Defensive Action . 1 26 Hill, a former Presbyterian minister, 
killed the doctor and one of the escorts with a twelve-gauge shot­
gun aimed at their heads. 127  In the same town seventeen months 
earlier, Dr. David Gunn, another abortion provider, was mur­
dered by a man associated with the pro-life movement. 1 28 Wnile 
denounced by some pro-life advocates, Paul Hill does have "some 
significant support" 1 29 for his position that: 
" [ t] he Christian principle is to do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you. If an abortionist is about to violently 
take an innocent person's  life, you are entirely morally j usti­
fied in trying to prevent him from taking that life." 1 30 
Applying this logic, those who kill at abortion sites do not care 
whether women's  equality or privacy is the reason legal abortions 
take place.  From their perspective, the substance rules.  
126 .  Ronald Smothers, Death of a Doctor: The Overoiew-Abortion Doctor and Bodyguard 
Slain in Florida; Protester is Arrested in Pensacola 's Second Clinic Killing, N.Y. TIMES , July 30, 
1994, at A l .  
127. !d. 
128. See Griffin to Appeal His Conviction of Murdering Doctor, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7, 1 994, 
at 5B. The defense claimed that graphic videos and anti-abortion literature "disturbed 
Griffin's state of mind to the extent he confessed to a crime he did not commit," !d. The 
brother of the victim agreed that "maybe the [anti-abortion] propaganda . . .  the movies 
. . .  [and] the meetings . . .  may have pushed [Griffin] "  to kill his brother." Griffin Verdict 
Praised, MIAMI HERALD , Mar. 7, 1994, at 5B. However, the Prosecution called the items 
"irrelevant and inflammatory," and the judge ruled that the jury would not see the evi­
dence, id., at 5B. 
129. See generally Tamar Lewin, Death of a Doctor: The Moral Debate - Abortion Doctor and 
Bodyguard Slain in Florida; A Cause Worth Killing For? Debate Splits Abortion Foes, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 30, 1994, at Al . Some of the nearly 100 anti-abortion leaders, who recently confer­
enced in Chicago, have not voiced their condemnation of Hill's violence, instead they are 
"reserving most of their outrage for those who interfere with abortion protests." !d. 
130. Smothers, supra note 126, at Al . 
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In sum, neither the privacy nor the equality arguments for re­
productive control ,  in principle,  condemn unborn life as worth­
less and claims of state interest as spurious. Both conclude that 
government may not assume the absolute power to decide the 
fate of the unborn, given what is at stake for women.  Disagree­
ments about bottom lines, about the extent to which abortion is 
permitted or restricted, is what divides Americans . 1 3 1  
C. Pinning the Blame for the Funding Decisions 
Privacy jurisprudence is blamed for the Court's refusal to grant 
poor women the right to state and federal assistance for elective 
or "non-therapeutic" abortions . 1 32 The usual argument is that 
conceptually privatizing abortion as in Roe rules out public assist­
ance. 1 33 Critics say the right to privacy means limited government 
involvement; it would be reasoning against the grain of privacy 
jurisprudence to find in the idea of a governmental duty to leave 
people alone, the idea of a governmental duty to assist the poor 
in seeking abortions. 
This criticism of the Roe decision is problematic for a number 
of reasons. First, it implies that liberal values in principle rule out 
all public programs. Although extreme libertarians have taken 
this view, more moderate and nuanced liberal political theories 
that value limited government do not proscribe all forms of pub­
lic assistance . The "liberal" Western nations have sought in prac­
tice to balance independence from government interference 
with reliance on government aid needed to make meaningful in-
1 3 1 .  My own basic bottom-line response is the same as it was in my book, UNEASY AC­
CESS: PRNACY FOR WoMEN IN A FREE SociETY ( 1988) . See also Anita L. Allen , Autonomy 's 
Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B. U. L. REv. 683 ( 1992) , Tribe 's 
judicious Feminism, 44 STAN. L. RF.v. 1 79 ( 1991 ) ,  and Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, 
and Social Contract Theary, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 461 ( 1 987) . 
1 32. See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 ( 1980) and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 ( 1977) 
(holding that neither state nor federal government must pay for a poor woman's abor­
tion) .  See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 1 73 ( 199 1 )  ( holding, under Title X of the Public 
Health Act, that the Government has no affirmative duty to commit any resources to 
facilitating abortions) ; Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 ( 1 989) 
(holding a state may restrict the use of public funds and facilities for the performance or 
assistance of non-therapeutic abortions) ; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 ( 1977) (holding that 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act does not require a state to fund non-therapeutic 
abortions as a condition of participation in the Medicaid program established by that 
Act) . 
1 33. See generally Ruth Colker, supra note 15;  MacKinnon, supra note 1 1 ;  Olsen,  supra 
note 3; Sunstein , supra note 10 .  But see Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conun­
drum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv. 
330, 338 ( 1 985) (concluding "it becomes difficult indeed to justify the government's deci­
sion not to fund an impecunious woman 's choice of abortion" ) .  
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dependence possible. A number of feminists, including Rachel 
Pine and Sylvia Law, have suggested that American constitution­
alism could accommodate affirmative understandings of privacy­
related liberty that are broad enough to support abortion fund­
ing. For example,  responding critically to the abortion funding 
cases, Pine and Law countered with a "feminist concept of repro­
ductive freedom" based on "affirmative liberty" and the idea that 
"government has the obligation to insure that people can make 
reproductive decisions freely. " 1 34 Dorothy Roberts, in reaction to 
Rust v. Sullivan, 1 35 describes a "liberation theory" version of con­
stitutional liberty that would "recognize the importance of infor­
mation for self-determination and therefore "place an affirmative 
obligation on the government to provide [abortion] information 
to people who are dependent on government funds . " 1 36 
Blaming privacy jurisprudence for the funding decisions is 
problematic for a second reason: it implies that these decisions 
would have stood a chance of coming out differently had Roe 
been decided on equal protection grounds . It is highly implausi­
ble to suppose that the funding cases would have come out dif­
ferently if Roe had been expressly defended under equal 
protection principles. The logic of equal protection in American 
constitutional law has not always required that the poor be given 
the resources needed to make them the substantive equals of 
other citizens. Equality is open in our jurisprudence to " equal 
opportunity" rather than "equality of results" interpretations. 
The Court could have acknowledged the goal of abolishing dis­
criminatory abortion laws, while ruling that the Constitution ' s  
Equal Protection Clause does not require government abortion 
subsidies. 
Roe v. Wade was a Burger Court decision. It  is especially un­
likely that that particular Supreme Court would have made the 
short leap from abortion equality to abortion subsidies.  The Bur­
ger Court was notable for an expansive Due Process Clause juris­
prudence, but a narrow reading of Equal Protection . 1 37 The 
Burger Court constricted the fundamental rights strand of equal 
protection that had enj oyed expansion during the Warren Court 
134. Pine and Law, supra note 9,  at 421 and n.53 and 54. 
135. 500 u.s. 1 73 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
136. D orothy E .  Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 6 1  GEo. WASH. L. 
REv. 587, 640 ( 1993 ) .  
137. See Michael Klannan, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 9 0  MICH . L .  
REv. 2 1 3 ,  289-90 ( 1991 ) .  
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era. In deciding equal protection cases, the Justices of the Burger 
Court "were more comfortable forbidding state regulation of cer­
tain spheres than requiring government equalization . . . of fun­
damental interests such as education , food, shelter, and medical 
care." 1 38 For the Burger Court the " reconceptualization of equal 
protection as an entitlement to affirmative government assist­
ance" was "unpalatable . " 1 39 And because it was, the Court could 
have reasoned that prohibiting states from criminalizing abor­
tion was a requirement of gender equality, but compelling state 
and federal government to pay for poor women 's  abortions was 
not. 
It is often assumed that concerns for women's  equality argue, 
without question, for abortion subsidies.  Yet many in the United 
States are mindful of the history of slavery and medical abuses of 
women and people of color. 1 40 As a consequence, state and fed­
eral legislators supportive of gender equality can cite egalitarian 
reasons for caution about sponsoring non-therapeutic abortions 
for poor women on welfare , many of whom are Latinos, recent 
immigrants , and African-Americans. Such sponsorship could 
lead to the appearance or reality of compulsory abortion . 
Although I favor public abortion subsidies , I do so 
circumspectfully. 
The future of meaningful health care reform in the Unite d  
States i s  uncertain.  However, the intense debates in 1 99 3  and 
1 994 over abortion benefits under President Bill Clinton 's  pro­
posed Health Security Act remain instructive on the question of 
whether privacy jurisprudence is to blame for the adverse out­
come in the abortion funding cases. In the context of proposed 
Congressional legislation, as in the context of judicial adjudica­
tion, accepting the right to abortion has not required accepting 
the concept of public funding. It  is unlikely that a Roe v. Wade 
premised on equal protection would have made a difference in 
the outcome of the debates about publically subsidized health 
insurance. Some members of Congress and their constituents op­
pose the idea of forcing taxpayers to subsidize acts they find hei­
nous on moral and religious grounds. The real foe of subsidized 
138 .  !d. at 289. 
139. !d. at 289-90. 
140. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 54, at 1444; Diana Axelsen, Women as Victims of Medical 
Experimentation: ]. Marian Sim5 ' Surgery on Slave Women, 1 845-1 850, 2 SAGE 10 ( 1985) . Cf 
jAMEs joNES, BAD BLooD: THE TusKEGEE SYPHILIS ExPERlMENT ( 198 1 )  (chronicle of gov­
ernment-sponsored experiments on black men with syphilis) . 
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medical abortion is not the supposed conceptual implications of 
privacy jurisprudence. Rather it is the widespread moral and reli­
gious substantive opposition to killing the unborn, 1 4 1  combined 
with pervasive political opposition to government compelled 
complicity with felt moral and religious wrongs. 
The rhetoric of privacy may fuel the abortion debates,  but the 
substance is driving them: a segment of our society is opposed to 
abortion. Some people are pro-life and do not want to pay for 
abortions through their taxes . Indeed, some people who are pro­
choice and pro-gender equality do not think it  is clearly proper 
to ask those who are pro-life to subsidize abortions. Were the cur­
rent Supreme Court miraculously to adopt the e qual protection 
framework for abortion law tomorrow, and the next day hear a 
constitutional challenge to a comprehensive national health in­
surance law that excluded mandatory abortion coverage, it is an 
open question how the Court would decide the contest. It seems 
probable that the Court would find the law constitutional. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
Privacy jurisprudence is criticized as too flimsy to serve as a 
stable base for abortion rights .  1 42 Some critics of &e embrace an 
equal protection alternative not yet expressly tested in the 
Supreme Court. Opponents of &e on the Court have not said 
they would change their votes if the grounds of abortion were 
presented in equal protection terms. Nor have the pro-life activ­
ists parading in front of clinics and vying for the attention of the 
media promised to throw down their placards in retreat if the 
Court adopts an equal protection analysis of abortion law. The 
reason , I believe , is that some judges and activists oppose the 
practice of abortion, not only "right to privacy" j urisprudence. 
In identifying factors that galvanized the anti-abortion move­
ment, Justice Ginsburg did not cite privacy jurisprudence itself; 
1 4 1 .  See Robin Toner, Political Memo; Abortion and the Health Plan: Hard Questions in Both 
Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12 ,  1 993, at A20. The Clinton health plan "creates a complicated 
new issue for" both pro-life and pro-choice activists "because [ the plan's) unified system 
with subsidies for the poor will largely erase the line between Federal and private money 
in the insurance sys tem." ld. Anna Quindlen, Publir. and Private; Trading Card, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 2,  1 993, at A27. Clinton's plan offers a new set of conscientious objections for an 
issue which "will be argued on the basis of deeply held feelings about what is just and 
moral, not on fiscal prudence." Jd. 
1 42. See David M. Smolin, The jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 
MARQ. L. REv. 975, 985 n.5 l (citing numerous works critical of Roe v. Wade's adoption of 
privacy jurisprudence) . 
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rather she cites the "sweep and detail" of the opinion in Roe v. 
Vvade. 1 43 The Court all at once swept away most of the nation's  
criminal abortion statutes and handed the states a trimester­
based guideline for regulation aimed at protecting women' s  
health and the state' s  interest i n  potential life .  Among those who 
oppose " [h ]  eavy-handed" 144 judicial intervention in whatever 
guise , for whatever cause, privacy jurisprudence is blamed for the 
unpopularity of permissive abortion laws . Yet an equal protec­
tion-based abortion jurisprudence of similar sweep and detail­
striking down all criminal abortion statutes that categorically out­
lawed early abortion and dividing pregnancy into trimesters of 
permissible and impermissible forms of regulation-might have 
inspired similar reactions. One must consider the possibility that 
equal protection can look "better" today only because it has not 
yet been tousled in the fray. 
1 43. See Ginsburg, supra note 74, at 38 1 .  
1 44. /d. a t  385. 
